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[L. A. No. 24968. In Bank. Apr. 24, 1959.] 
THE TEXAS COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant, v. 
THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Respondents. 
[L. A. No. 25102. In Bank. Apr. 24, 1959.] 
FORSTER SHIPBUILDING COMPANY, INC. (a Cor-
poration) et al., Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LOS AN-
GELES, Respondent. 
[1] Taxation - Assessment - Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-The 
taxable interest in a leasehold is the right to possession and 
use of the land for the unexpired term of the lease; its value 
is not lessened by the amount the lessee agreed to pay for it, 
but is determined by the present value of the use for the period 
of the lease and the value of the lessor's interest is determined 
by the present value of the use thereafter. The lessor's right to 
receive rent is not an interest in the land that must be deducted 
to determine the value of the lessee's interest, but only the 
price the lessee must pay for it. 
[1] Method or rule for valuation of leasehold interest for purpose 
of. property taxation, note, 84 A.L.R. 1310. See also Oal.J'ur.2d Tax-
ation, § 187; Am.J'ur., Taxation, § 711 et seq. 
lIrIcK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 8, 13, 15] Taxation, § 191; [3, 4] 
Taxation, § 186; [5,6] Taxation, § 189; [7] Eminent Domain, § 50; 
[9] Taxation, § 58; [10, 12] Taxation, §§ 72, 73; [11] Taxation, 
172; [14] Taxation, § 24 . 
• 
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[2] Id. - Assessment - Va.luation--Leasehold Estatcs.-In deter· 
mining taxable interest in a leasehold, the leasehold is not less 
valuable because it has not be('n paid for in advance, and to 
draw a distinction between rent paid and rent to be paid 
confuses the equity the lessee has in the leasehold with its 
value. That equity, which may arise either from the lessee's 
prepayment of rent or from an excess of the value of the use 
. over the future rent agreed to be paid for it, is of no moment 
to a prospective purchaser interested only in the value of the 
use and possession for the unexpired term of the lease; such 
purchaser will pay for that interest what it is worth and, since 
it belongs to the lessee, it is taxable to him at that value 
whether or not he has assumed rental or other obligations that 
will prevent his realizing any return to himself. 
[3] ld. - Assessment - Valua.tion - Mode of Valuation.-The net 
earnings to be capitalized, under the capitalization of income 
method of valuing property, are not those of the present owner 
of the property, but those l'eflected by the price a pro!'pective 
purchaser might be expected to pllY. 
[4] ld.-Assessment-Valuation-Mode of Valua.tion.-Taxation 
of property at its value without regard to the owner's equity 
therein is an established principle of ad valorem taxation. 
[6] ld.-Assessment-Valuation-Real Property-Possessory Es-
tates.-A conditional vendee or a mortgagor is taxable at the 
full value of property as its owner though he could realize little 
or nothing by its sale. 
[8] ld.-Assessment-Valuation-B.eal Property-Possessory Es-
tates.-The continued enjoyment of the benefits of ownership 
of a fee or possessory interest is dependent on discharging the 
obligations to secure such benefits, and for tax pW'poses there 
is no logical basis for treating those obligations differently as 
they happen to run to a lessor, a conditional vendor or a 
mortgagee. 
[7] Eminent Doma.in-Compensa.tion-Lea.seholda.-In eminent do-
main the full value of the lessee's possessory jnt.erest must be 
paid for, but since the taking discharges the obligation to pay 
future rent, the value of that obligation to the lessor must be 
awarded to him. Although the lessee is awarded damages 
equal only to the value of his equity, he receives the full value 
of his possessory intere.~t, since his obligation to pay rent is 
discharged. 
[8] Ta.xa.tion-Assessment-Valuation-Leasehold Estates.-In de-
termining the taxable interest of a leasehold, the value of a 
long-term possessory interest in the leasehold may approach 
the value of the fee and, even in the case of land that doe:i 
[7] See O~.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, § 36; Am.Jur., Eminent 
Domain, §§ 232,296 . 
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not depreciate in vRlue, the present valuc of a reversion that 
cannot be enjoyed for many ~'eRrs may he small compared to 
the present vlllue of the use in the intE'l;m. Thus, the value 
of the right to use the land in perpetuity may be little ~rellter 
than the value of the right to nse it for the durlltion of a long. 
term lellse, and in such case a purchRser of the fee of unleased 
land would PIlY or agree to pay little more than a lessee for a 
long-term lease. 
[9] ld.-Subjects of Taxation-Leaseholds.-A city leasing its land 
does not merely use it, but creates valuable privately-held 
possessory interests, and the owners of such interests must pay 
taxes on them just as lessees of private property do through 
increased rents. Their use is not public, but private, and as such 
should carry its share of the tax burden. 
[10] ld.-Exemptions-Municipal Property.-A city does not lose 
its tax exemption by leasing its land; the reversion is not 
taxed, since it is only the value of the use for the unexpired 
term of that lease that is assessed. Whereas lessees of private 
property indirectly pay taxes through rent on the full value of 
the land including the lessor's reversion, the city's lessees pay 
taxes only on the value of the possessory interests granted to 
them by the city. 
[11] ld.-Exemptions-Municipal Property.-A city is not afforded 
a competitive advantage over private owners when it sells the 
fee in its land, since the land is taxable to its new private 
owner whatever its source. 
[12] ld.-Exemptions-Municipal Property.-A city is not entitled 
to a competitive advantage over private lessors when it sells 
lesser interests carved out of the public domain. It would be 
able to charge higher rents if it could extend the mllntle of its 
tax exemption over the private interests it creates in its lands, 
but since it is only its own property that is tax exempt, it is not 
entitled to that advantage. Since the tax is on the private 
interest alone, it is immaterial that denial of that competitive 
advantage might be an economic burden on the city. 
[13] ld.-Assessmcnt-Valuation-Leasehold Estates. - The rule 
that where a constitutional provision or statute has received 
a given construction by a court of last resort and contracts 
have been made or property rights acquired "under and in 
accordance with its decision such contracts will not be invali-
dated nor will vested rights acquired under the decision be 
impaired by a change of construction adopted in a subsequent 
decision, is not applicable in a case involving the taxable in-
terest in a leasehold, since recognition of the correct rule of 
valuation of possessory interests for tax purposes neither in-
vulidatt's the leases nol' impairs v~sted rights. 
[9] See Cal.Jur.2d, Taxation, § 57; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 435. 
) 
[14] Id. - Statute - Amendment or Change-Vested Rigats.-AI-
. though t1l08e who Require property or make eOlltracts in reli-
ance on existing tax laws may be disappointed in their cconomir. 
expectations whl'n those laws are chanb-ed, they acquire no 
. vestc.d right that such changes shall not be made. Taxes on 
existing interests are not immutable, since within constitutional 
limits the Legislature has full freedom to change them. 
[15] Id. - Assessment - Valuation - Leasehold Estates.-Rev. & 
Tax. Code, § 107.1, relating to assessmell.t of possessory inter-
ests arising out of a lease of exempt property, cannot be given 
retrospective effeet with regard to taxes that became due before 
the code section became effective, since to do so would authorize 
an unconstitutional gift of public funds. (Const., art. IV, § 31.) 
APPEAL from jUdgments of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. H. Eugene Breitenbach and John F. Aiso, 
Judges. Affirmed. 
Actions to recover taxes on possessory interests in tax-
exempt lands owned by a city. Judgments for defendants after 
their demurrers were sustained, affirmed. 
J. A. Tucker, C. L. Mead, Jr., R. K. Barrows, Holbrook, 
Tarr & O'Neill, W. Sumner Holbrook, Jr., and Francis H. 
o 'Neill for Appellants. 
J. Kerwin Rooney, Port Attorney (Oakland), and Robert 
G. Cockins, City Attorney (Santa Monica), as Amici Curiae 
on behalf of AppeUants. 
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Alfred Charles 
DeFlon, Deputy County Counsel for Respondents. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, James E. Sabine, Assistant 
Attorney General, Ernest P. Goodman, Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, Felix S. Wahrhaftig, Albert E. Weller, County Counsel 
(San Bernardino), J. B. Lawrence, Deputy County Counsel, 
James Don Keller, District Attorney and County Counsel (San 
Diego), CarroU H. Smith, Deputy County CounS'el, Roy A. 
Gustafson, District Attorney (Ventura), Joel E. Ogle, County 
Counsel (Orange), Stephen K. Tamura, Assistant County 
Counsel, and MandIe Rottman as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Respondents. . 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaiutiff'R brought these aetiolls to recover 
taxes for the years 1956 and J 957 on possessory intereRts ill 
tax-exempt lands owned by the city of I.Jos Angeles. Jl1dg-
) 
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mellL .. for dcC('ntilluts WCl·.' (,1I1f'rl'd art.'r t1"'ir .1f'lIIl1l·\·t>rK wel'f' 
sustained, and plaintiffs appeal. 
The basic issue presented is whether the value of a possessory ; 
interest in tax-exempt land under the capitalization of income 
method of valuation is the present worth of the use of the land 
for the unexpired term of the lease or that worth less the 
present worth of rentals to become due. 
Plaintitrs contend that the county board of equalization 
erred in sustaining assessments based on the present worth 
of the use of the land for the unexpired term of the lease. 
They point out that the "full cash value" standard of assess-
ment (Const., art. XI, § 12; Rev. & Tax. Code, § 401), is 
defined as "the amount at which property would be taken in 
payment of a just debt from a solvent debtor" (Rev. & Tax. 
Code, § 110), or "the price it would bring if offered on an open 
market under conditions in which neither buyer nor seller 
could take advantage of the exigencies of the other" (DeLuz 
Homes, be. v. County of San Diego, 45 Cal.2d 546, 563 [290 
P.2d 544]), and that a prospective assignee of the lease would 
pay only the difference between the value of the use he would 
receh'e and the rental obligation he would assume. Accord-
ingly, they conclude that it is that difference or bonus value, 
if any, that is the taxable value of the leasehold. 
Plaintiffs would also arrive at the same valuation for the 
leasehold by deducting the value of the claimed interest of thc 
lessor in the land from the value of the fee. Thus, the value 
of the fee is taken as the present worth of the use of the land 
in pefpetuity. The lessor retains the present value of the use 
of the reversion plus the present value of the rents reserved. 
If the present value of the rents reserved is equal to the 
present value of the use for the unexpired term of the lease, 
the lessor's interest would be equal to the fee value and' the 
lessee's interest would be valueless. Plaintiffs conclude that 
under either of these approaches a possessory interest has 
value only if the value of the use of the land exceed!; the rent 
payable under the lease. 
, [1] Defendants contend that the taxable interest is the 
right to possession and use of the land for the unexpired 
term of the lease and that its value is not lessened by the 
amount the lessee has agreed to pay for it. They contend 
that there is no distinction for tax purposes between granting 
the possession and use in perpetuity by a sale of the fee and 
granting them for a limited period by a leasf', that in neithpt" 
casc lllay till' .'ost of the interest granh'd he dl'duf'ted fro:1I 
\ ! 
) 
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its value. In the case of a lease, they would divide the total 
value· of the fee as determined by its use according to the 
value. of the uses for the respective periods involved. Thus 
the value· of the lessee;s interest would be determined by the 
present value of the use for the period of the lease and the 
value of the lessor's interest by thc present value of the usc 
thereafter. Together they would equal the present value of 
the use in perpetuity, or fee value. They conclude that the 
lessor's right to receiYe rent is not an interest in the land 
that must be deducted to determine the value of the lessee's 
interest but only the price the lessee must pay for it. 
DeLuz Homes, Inc. v. Oounty of San Diego, 45 Ca1.2d 546 
[290 P.2d 544] ; Fairfield Gardens, Inc.v. Oounty of Solano, 
45 Ca1.2d 575 [290 P.2d 562] ; Victor Valley Housing OOt·p. 
v. Oounty of San Bernardino, 45 Cal.2d 580 [290 P.2d 565] ; 
and El Toro Dev. 00. v. Oounty of Orange, 45 Ca1.2d 586 
[290 P.2d 569], fully support defendants' contentious. Those 
cases all involved the valuation of long-term possessory inter-
ests in federally owned property by the capitalization of in-
come method. Relying on L. W. Blinn Lbr. 00. v. Oounty of 
Los Angeles, 216 Cal. 474 [14 P.2d 512J; and Hammond 
Lbr. 00. v. Oounty of L08 Angeles, 104 Cal.App. 235 [285 P. 
896], the taxpayers contended that deductions from expected 
gross income should be made both for rent and amortization 
of the cost of improvements that became the property of the 
lessor and would revert to it on the termination of the lease. 
Although the assessors had allowed deductions for the nominal ! 
ground rental of $100 per year applicable to each leasehold, 
they had denied deductions for amortization. We concluded, 
however, that no distinction could be made between rent 
and the cost of improvements that revert to the lessor, for 
both were part of the purchase price of the leasehold, and 
held that no deduction could be made for that purchase price. 
We disapproved statements to the contrary in the Blinn 
case and pointed out that the assessor's allowance of a de-
duction for rent in the Hammond case did not control that 
decision. (DeLuz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 45 
Ca1.2d 546, 567, 570 [290 P.2d 544].) 
Plaintiffs contend, however, that in the DeLuz case and its 
companion cases the court was concerned only with deduc-
tions for rent paid in the past, not rent to become due in the 
rutur(>. 'fhere is no merit in this contention. We were con-
cerned with deductions from expected gross income, deduc-
tions that would necessarily be made, if allowed, against in-
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comc to accrue in the future. Obviously only .future rcnt 
could be relevant in this context. Thus, in Fairfield Gar-
dens, Inc. v. County of Solano, 45 Ca1.2d 575, 578-579 [290, 
P.2d 562], we stated: "The method used by the assessor inl 
the present case is similar to that approved in DeLuz, but 
we must disapprove it to the extcnt that it deducts rent 
paid by Fairfield to the government from anticipated annual 
gross income. The rent that a leasehold would command on an 
open market under conditions in which neither buyer nor 
seller could take advantage of the exigencies of the other is 
based on expected future net income from the leasehold with-
out regard to the rent presently paid by the lessee, and there- I 
fore such rent is not deducted in estimating the earning power 
of the leasehold. The assessment of the possessory interest 
of Fairfield for thc tax year 1953-1954, however, need not 
be set aside becausc of the erroneous deduction of the $200 
rent paid to the government [two leaseholds were involved], 
for although the error was favorable to the taxpayer, the 
county did not appeal [citations], and, moreover, de minimis 
non curat le:c. [Citations.]" Since the deduction involved 
had been made from" anticipated annual gross income," it is 
clear that the $200 rent referred to ,vas not a single payment 
made in the past but the obligation to pay $200 each year in 
the future pursuant to the terms of the existing leases. 
[2] A leasehold is not less valuable because it has not 
been paid for in advance, and to draw a distinction between 
rent paid and rent to be paid confuses the equity the lessee 
has in the leasehold with its value. That equity may arise 
either from the lessee's prepayment of rent or from an excess 
of the value of the use over the future rent agreed to be paid 
for it. It may not exist at all. In any event it is of no 
moment to a prospective purchaser interested only in the 
value of the use and possession of the property for the un-
expired term of the lease. Such a purchaser will pay for that 
interest what it is worth, and since it belongs to' the lessee, 
it is taxable to him at that value whether or not he has as-
sumed rental or other obligations that will prevent his real-
izing any return to himself. [3] .. The present owner may 
have invested well or poorly, lllay have contracted to pay very 
high rent or very low rent, and may have built expensive 
improvements or none at all. To value the property by 
capitalizing his anticipated net earnings would make the value 
of property equal to the present value of his profits; since, 
however, the legislative standard is «full cash value,' it is 
62 TEXAS Co. tI. COUNTY OF Los ANGELES [52 C.2d 
clear that whatever may be the rationale of the property tax, 
it is not the profitableness of property to its present owner. 
If a purchaser wonld buy a given property on an open market, 
t he property has a value equal to the price such purchaser 
might be expected to pay." (DeLuz Homes, Inc. v. County 
of San Diego, 45 Cal.2d 546, 566 [290 P.2d 544].) 
[4] Taxation of property at its value without regard to 
the owner's equity therein is an established principle of ad 
valorem taxation. [5] Thus, a conditional vendee or a mort-
gagor is taxable at the full value of property as its owner 
even though he could realize little or nothing by its sale. 
(S.B.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 569-570 [66 S.Ct. 
749, 90 L.Ed. 851]; Eisley v. Mohan, 31 Cal.2d 637, 643 
[192 P.2d 5] ; DeLuz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 
45 Ca1.2d 546, 573 [290 P.2d 544].) [6] The continued 
enjoyment of the benefits of ownership of the fee or a pos-
sessory interest is dependent on discharging the obligations 
assumed to secure such benefits, and there is no logical basis 
for treating those obligations differently as they happen to 
run to a lessor, a conditional vendor, or a mortgagee. 
[7] The distinction between the value of the lessee's pos-
sessory interest and his equity therein demonstrates why the 
value of that interest is not the same as the damages the 
lessee would receive if it were taken by eminent domain. In 
eminent domain the full value of the interest must be paid 
for, but since the taking discharges the obligation to pay 
future rent, the value of that obligation to the lessor must be 
awarded to him. (City of Pasadena v. Porter, 201 Cal. 381, 387 
[257 P. 526, 53 A.L.R. 679].) Although the lessee is awarded 
damages equal only to the value of his equity, he receives the 
full value of his possessory interest, for his obligation to pay 
rent is discharged. 
[8] It wonld be anomalous to hold that a possessory in-
terest has no value merely because the lessee has agreed 
to pay what it is worth. As we pointed out in the DeLuz 
case, the value of a long-term possessory interest may.approach 
the value of the fee (45 Ca1.2d at 570), and even in the case 
of land that does not depreciate in value, the present value 
of a reversion that cannot be enjoyed for many years may be 
small compared to the present value of the use in the interim. 
Thus, the value of the right to use the land in perpetuity may 
be little greater than the value of the right to use it for the 
Juration of a long-term lease, and in such a case a purchaser 
of the fee of unleased land would payor agree to pay little 
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more t.hall a I .. s~'(>'· \lIII11r1 f"I' .1 l"llg "'1"111 1'·lLSI'. We would 
trifle with rcality 10 hold thaL Ilcw(·thcless the lessee received 
nothing of value whereas the purchaser received the full value 
of the fee. 
Plaintiffs contend, however, that unless rent is deducted ill 
computing the net income for "aluation purposes, au uncon-
stitutional tax 011 the city's tax-exempt interest will be im-
posed. (Const. art. XIII, § 1.) They point out that the land 
is tax exempt regardless of how it is used and that therefore 
the city's exemption is not lost because it uses its land by 
leasing it to private parties. If its lessees, however, unlike 
:lessees of privately-owned land, must pay taxes on their 
: possessory interests ill addition to rent equal to the full rental 
i value, the city will necessarily have to reduce its rents by 
the amount of such taxes to compete with private lessors. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs conclude that to value leaseholds with-
out making a deduction for rent will result in imposing a tax 
on the city's right to use its land by lea.c;ing it. 
[9] When the city leases its land, however, it does not 
merely use it. It creates valuable privately-held possessory 
interests, and there is no reason why the owners of such in-
terests should not pay taxes on them just as lessees of private 
property do through increased rents. Their use is not public, 
but private, and as such should carry its share of the tax 
burden. [10] Moreover, the city does not lose its tax exemp-
tion by leasing its land. The reversion is not taxed, for it is 
only the value of the use for the unexpired term of the lease 
that is assessed. Thus, whereas lessees of private property 
indirectly pay taxes through increased rent on the full value 
of the land including the lessor's reversion, the city's lessees 
pay taxes only on the value of the possessory interests granted 
to them lly the city. The city retains the full benefit of its 
tax exemption on the interest it has retained. [11] The city 
is not afforded a competitive advantage over private owners 
when it sells the fee, for the land is taxable to its new private 
owner whatever its source. [12] Similarly, the city is not 
entitled to a competitive advantage over private lessors when 
it sells lesser interests carved out of the public domain. Of. 
course the city would be able to charge higher rents if it 
could extend the mantle of its tax exemption over the private 
interests it creates in its lands, but since it is only its own 
property that is tax exempt, it is not entitled to that advan-
tage. Since the tax is on the private interest alone, it is im-
mat.erial tlHlt 1111' dellial of tlmt "o'lIpl'titive advallt::.::!!' might 
) 
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he an ('conomi~ burden on the dty. (General Dynamics Corp. 
'\'". Crntnty ,,' Lo.' A n.gele$, 51 (;111.2(1 at pp. 59, 63 [330 
r.2d 794], and ('asl's cited.) 
[13] Plaintiffs contend that sillce the DeLuz case over-
. ruled the Blinn case, it should be given prospective effect 
only and should not be applied in valuing leaseholds created 
before it was decided. 'I'hey rely on CO!L11ty of Los Angeles 
v. FallS, 48 Ca1.2d 672, 681 [312 P.2d 680], decided after the 
DeLuz case, in which the court stated that "where a consti-
tutional provision or statute has received a given construction 
by a court of last resort and contracts have been made or 
property rights acquired under and in accordance with its 
decision, such contracts will not be invalidated nor will vested 
rights acquired under the decision be impaired by a change 
of construction adopted in a subsequent decision. Under 
those circumstances it has been the rule to give prospective, 
and not retrospective, effect to the later deci~ion." 
The rule of the Faus case is not applicable here, for recog-
nition of the correct rule of valuation of possessory interests 
for tax purposes neither invalidates the leases nor impairs 
vested rights. Thus we did not apply the Faus rule in the 
DeLuz case, although it had been recognized in earlier cases. 
(See People v. Ryan, 152 Cal. 364, 369 [92 P. 853] ; People 
v. Maughs, 149 Cal. 253, 263 [86 P. 187].) Moreover, in 
these cases the taxes did not become due before the DeLuz 
case was decided, defendants are not seeking to collect addi-
tional taxes for years prior to that decision, and there is no 
machinery by which they could do so. The assessor has ap-
plied the DeLuz rule in these cases only to taxes on existing 
interests falling due after the date of that decision. In no 
proper sense may such application be considered retro~ctive. 
[14] Although those who acquire property or make con-
tracts in reliance of the existing tax laws may be disappointed 
in their economic expectations when those laws are changed, 
they acquire no vested right that such changes shall not be 
made. Taxes on existing interests are not immutable, for 
within constitutional limits the Legislature has full freedom 
to change them. Surely an erroneous interpretatiou of a tax 
statute cannot be more immutable than the statute itself, and 
if the court failed to give effect to the correction of- its own 
error, it would defeat the legislative purpose not only as to 
the past but for the indefinite future. 
Cases cited by plaintiffs giving prospective effect to tax 
decisions are fully in accord with our conclusion herein. AI-
-.... 
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though in MOIlII' of t hrm till' C'ollrt. Rl'pl il'd t hI' III'W rule only 
to taxes falling due after the date o[ th(' drcision (Button v. 
Drake, 302 Ky. 517 (195 S.W.2d 66, 70, 167 A.L.R. 1046]; 
German Gymnastic Assn. v. City of lhuisville, 306 Ky. 810 
[209 S.W.2d 75, 76] ; Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge 
No. 197, I.O.O.F., 195 Okla. 131 (156 P.2d 340, 358] ; Boarel 
of Equalization v. Tulsa Pythian, etc. Assn., 195 Okla. 458 
[158 P.2d 904, 906]; Mercantile Nat. Batik v. Lander, 109 
F. 21, 25-26; Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Wisconsin Dept. of 
Tax., 260 Wis. 551 (51 N.W.2d796, 799-800] ; Arizona State 
Tax Com. v. Ensign, 75 Ariz. 376 [257 P.2d 392, 393]; 
Franklin Oounty Court v. Louisville & Nash. R. R. Co., 84 
Ky. 59, 64-65), in others the court applied the new rule to 
determine the tax liability then in litigation but pointed out 
that it would not apply to taxpayers whose past liability had 
been determined without litigation in reliance on the over-
ruled decision. (Duhame v. State Tax Com., 65 Ariz. 268 
[179 P.2d 252, 259-2EiO, 261-262,171 A.L.R. 684] ; Yarbrough 
v. Oklahotna Tax. Com., 200 Okla. 402 (193 P.2d 1017, 1021] ; 
see also Swank v. Tyndall, 226 Ind. 204 [78 N.E.2d 535, 
543].) In none of the cases does it appear that the new rule 
,vas not to apply to taxes thereafter falling due on existing 
property, and in several it appears expressly that it was. 
(German Gymnastic Assn. v. Oity of Loltisville, 306 Ky. 810 
[209 S.W.2d 75, 76] ; Oklahoma County v. Queen C-ity Lodge 
No. 197, I.O.O.F., 195 Okla. 131 [156 P.2d 340, 358] ; Board 
of Equalizaticm v. Tftlsa Pythian, etc. Assn., 195 Okla. 458 
[158 P.2d 904, 906].) 
In 1957 the Legislature added section 107.1- to the Revenue 
·Section 101.1 of the Revenue and Taxation Code provides: 
II A pOllllesso~ interest, when arising out of a lease of exempt propert;r • 
. eonsiats of the lessee's interest under sueh lease and is hereby declared 
to be personal property within the meaning of Bection 14 of Article XIII 
of the Constitution of the State of Califomia. 
"The full eash value of such p08se890~ interest is the exceas, if any. 
of the value of the lease on the open market, a. determined by the 
formula contained in the eaBe of DeLus Homell, InC. v. C010Iflfy 0/ 8"" 
Diego (1955), 45 CaL2d 546 [290 P.2d 544], over the present worth of 
the rentals under said lease for the unexpired term thereof. 
"A possessory interest taxable under the provisions of this section 
ilhall be assessed to the lessee on the same basis or percentage of valua· 
tion employed as to other tangible property on the lame roll. 
"This section applies only to possessorY interests created prior to the 
date on which the decision of the California Supreme Court in DeLus 
Home" If1c. v. C01l"ty Of S"n Diego (19;;5),45 Ca1.2d 546, became final. 
It does not, however, apply to any of sueh interests ereated prior to that 
date that thereafter have been, or may hereafter be, extended or renewed, 
52 C.2d·- 3 
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anrl Taxation' ("--ode. It providf''' t.hat the "full cash value" 
of p0f;.<les,o.:ory intercstR created bcrore the decision ill the DeLuz 
case shall be determined by the formula adopted in that case 
less "the present worth of the rentals under said lease for 
the -unexpired term thereof." Although the taxes involved ill 
these cases became due before the effective date of scction 
107.1, plaintiffs contend that the section constitutes curath'e 
legislation and should therefore be given restrospcctive effect. 
Defendants contend that the section is unconstitutional and 
that, in any event, it cannot be given retrospcctive effcct. 
[15] The constitutionality of section 107.1 is directly in-
volved in a case now pending in the District Court of Appeal, 
Second Appellate District. For the purposes of the present 
case we may assume without deciding that the statute is con-
stitutional. Since the taxes became due before the section 
became effective, it cannot be given restrospeetive effect, for 
to do so would authorize an unconstitutional gift of public 
funds. (Const., art. IV, § 31; Estate of Skinkc1', 47 Cal.2d 
290, 296 {303 P.2d 745] ; Estate of Potter, 188 Cal. 55, 60 
[204 P. 826] ; Estate of Rossi, 169 Cal. 148, 149 [146 P. 430] ; 
Estate of MarUn, 153 Cal. 225, 228 {94 P. 1053] ; Trippet v .. 
State, 149 Cal. 521, 528 (86 P. 1084, 8 L.R.A.N.S. 1210]; 
Estate of Stanford, 126 Cal. 112, 118-121 [54 P. 259, 58 P. 
462, 45 L.R.A. 788] ; Doctors General Hospital v. County of 
Santa CZar'a, 150 Cal.App.2d 53, 55-57 [309 P.2d 501].) 
Allen v. Franchise Taz Boar'd, 39 Cal.2d 109 [245 P.2d 297], 
and Gartner v. Roth, 26 Cal.2d 184 [157 P.2d 361], are not to 
the contrary. The Allen case involved a change in the in-
come tax law that became effective before the state's right 
to the tax vested, and the Gartner case involved not a change 
in tax liability but a change in the law governing the right 
to redeem property deeded to the state for nonpayment of 
taxes. 
The judgments are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Spence, J., and Petets, J., con-
curred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would reverse the judgments 
for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Ashburn in the opinion 
irrespective of whether the renewal or extension is prol'jdcd for in the 
instrument ereating the interest. 
,. This section does not apply to leasehold estates for the production of 
ItIlS, petroleum and other hydrocarbon substances from b!'neath the Bur· 
fnee of the earth, and other rights relating to such substances whil'h 
constitute inl'orporl'ul her'lditnments or profitll a prp.ndre." 
) 
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6; 
prepal'ctl 11.\' him for the District Court of Appeal ill Tc.rq.~ 
Co. v. C01lllt1l of Los Angeles and l!'OI'stcr Shipbuilding CII. 
v. County of Lo.,AlIgeles, (Cal.App.) 333 P.2d 97. 
Apt>ellants' petitions for a rehearing were denied May 20, 
1959. McComb, J., was of the opinion that the petitions should 
be granted. 
